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ABSTRACT: Power transmission networks are critical infrastructure systems of urban communities, but 
are prone to cascading failures due to their high level of interconnectivity. Therefore, it is of great interest 
to identify critical components of the network that may trigger cascading failures. However, existing 
approaches to identify critical cascading failures focus on topological effect for a limited number of 
initial component failures. Meanwhile, identification based on load flow analysis without a limit on the 
number of triggering component failures has not been extensively studied. In this study, we simulate the 
overload-induced cascading failures to find the most critical scenarios of initial failure events in a power 
grid. The proposed approach uses the multi-group non-dominant sorting algorithm (Choi and Song, 2017) 
with two objective functions, i.e. network impact measure, and the number of initial component failures. 
Numerical experiments on a 30-bus network demonstrate that the identified critical cascading scenarios, 
triggered by single and multiple component failures, may not share common components necessarily. 
The proposed approach is expected to identify a group of critical components, which may be neglected 
by existing approaches. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Electric power supply networks are considered 
one of the most critical infrastructure systems 
supporting urban communities which thus needs 
to be secured with a priority. Due to the ever-
growing demand of electric energy and the high 
interdependency of infrastructure networks, 
however, the disaster risk of power networks also 
increases. Moreover, estimating the propagation 
of the damaging effect through the power system 
becomes challenging. For instance, the electric 
power blackouts in Italy (2003), the North-
Eastern U.S and Canada (2003), and Eastern India 
(2012), which brought catastrophic losses, were 
triggered from unexpected damage scenarios with 
low likelihoods (Andersson et al., 2005). To 
secure the service continuity and to avoid such 
significant direct and indirect losses due to the 
blackout, therefore, identification of critical post-
disaster scenarios of the power grid is an 
important task.  
To date, to identify critical scenarios of the 
infrastructure network, which are defined as a 
small number of initial component failures 
resulting in disproportionate consequences, 
various optimizing methods and impact measures 
have been proposed. Consequence-based search 
using multi-objective algorithms were proposed 
to detect critical components in the fields of 
reliability engineering, computer science and 
operational research (Rocco et al., 2009; Zio et al., 
2012; Ventresca et al., 2015 and 2018). 
Particularly, NSGA-II (Deb et al., 2002), a non-
dominant sorting genetic algorithm has been 
popular as the main search algorithm. While 
NSGA-II approach successfully resolved many of 
critical component identification problems, it has 
been reported in a few papers that some of the 
final non-dominant solutions were neglected as 
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the network size increases (Ventresca et al., 2018). 
This issue is partly related to the loss of the 
population diversity in early generations of 
NSGA-II. Therefore, to preserve the diversity of 
samples, the authors recently proposed a multi-
group non-dominant sorting algorithm (MG-
NSGA) in previous work (Choi and Song, 2017).  
In such an optimization-based search, 
defining proper impact measures is a key to 
finding critical components of the networks. Even 
for the identical network, a different set of the 
critical components could be identified depending 
on the definitions. As for the power grid, it is 
important to assess the impact of the final stage of 
the cascading failure since the initial failure and 
the final consequence could differ greatly. 
A number of recent studies addressed the 
cascading analysis mainly in terms of the 
topology of the power system (Zio et al., 2012; Li 
et al. 2013). This is mainly because the 
topological approach has an advantage in the 
simplicity of analysis and requires relatively less 
input data. However, a cascading failure in a 
power grid is sequential failures with strong 
interdependency due to the load re-distribution, 
which is affected by both network topology and 
electric properties of the individual components. 
Therefore, for improved simulations of cascading 
failure sequence, load flow analysis should be 
performed using additional information instead of 
relying on network topology only. 
There have been limited studies that consider 
the cascading failures triggered by more than one 
initial failure. The previous research focused on 
the cascading failures triggered by a single 
component failure (Li et al., 2013) or up to four 
(Zio et al., 2012). This may due to the complexity 
and the computational cost required for 
simulating cascading failures in a power grid. 
However, in practical circumstances, natural and 
manmade disasters often induce multiple 
component failures simultaneously. Therefore, 
cascading failures caused by multiple component 
failures should be considered. 
To identify critical cascading scenarios of a 
power system with consideration of power flow 
analysis but without imposing constraints on the 
number of trigger components, this study uses 
overload cascading model (OCM) and multi-
group non-dominant sorting genetic algorithm 
(MG-NSGA). The main features are summarized 
as follows: (1) To identify the critical post-
disaster scenarios, the damage impact at the final 
cascade stage is considered as one of the objective 
functions; (2) To evaluate the impact measure, 
over-load cascading failure analysis, which 
includes repeated DC load flow analysis, is 
performed; and (3) The cascading failures 
triggered by not only single component, but also 
multiple network components are investigated 
using the MG-NSGA approach. 
Through applications to numerical examples, 
we investigate whether critical cascading 
scenarios, simulated by overload cascading model 
and induced by one or more initial component 
failure can be effectively identified using the MG-
NSGA. Through further development, this 
methodology is expected to broaden the 
understanding of cascading failure risk inherent in 
power supply networks. 
Sections 2 and 3 respectively provide the 
formulations and procedures of the cascading 
model, and MG-NSGA. In Section 4, the power 
grid example is presented as the case study. After 
providing the results and discussions in Section 5, 
Section 6 summarizes the paper along with 
concluding remarks.  
2. SIMULATING CASCADING FAILURE OF 
POWER SYSTEM 
In this paper, power supply networks are modeled 
such that power flow of transmission lines are 
estimated based on computational simulation of 
overload cascading failures. To this end, the 
sequence of interdependent failures is modeled 
using overload cascade model (OCM). Damage 
measures of this study, which are evaluated using 
the final cascading results, are also described. 
2.1. Modeling power system 
Using graph theory, network topology of the 
power system could be expressed by nodes and 
edges. Each bus of the power system, including 
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the generator and/or load, becomes a node while 
the power transmission lines become edges.  
2.2. Estimating line power flows: DC load flow 
To estimate the load flow in each line component 
of a power system, the power flow equations 
(Grainger, J. J. and Stevenson Jr, W. D.,1994) are 
employed in this study. Depending on whether the 
reactive power is accounted or not, the power flow 
analysis could be conducted using two different 
equations, i.e. AC flow analysis and DC power 
flow analysis. The AC power flow considers both 
active and reactive powers while the DC power 
flow considers only active power. Since the AC 
load flow analysis considers both active and 
reactive power, the analysis may require iterative 
calculations, and also does not ensure the 
convergence. As the simplified and linearized 
version of the AC load flow, on the other hand, 
the DC load flow analysis provides the solution 
without iterations. Therefore, in the optimization 
problem of the power supply system problem, the 
DC load flow estimation is often used because of 
its simplicity and effectiveness (Koh et al., 2003). 
In this research, we adopt the DC load flow 
analysis to avoid time-consuming iterations of 
load flow analysis during the cascading analysis 
and the search by use of a genetic algorithm.  
In the DC load flow analysis, the AC system 
is simplified through the following assumptions: 
(1) Line resistance is negligible; (2) Voltage angle 
difference is assumed to be small; and (3) 
Magnitudes of bus voltage are set to the flat 
voltage profile. By these assumptions, the DC 
flow equations can be expressed as 
 
ij ij ijf b   (1) 
where 
ijf  and ijb  are respectively the active 
power flow and susceptance of the line 
ijl  
connecting node i  and j ; and ij  is the voltage 
phase difference between the nodes. The power 
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where iP  is the active power flow at node i  and 
d  is the degree of node i . As a result, the active 
power flows in a certain transmission line i , 








  (3) 
where 
LiX is the reactance of line i . The load 
flows through branches are expressed using a 
matrix form 
 1[ ]    (4) 
 ( )   
L
b A  (5) 
where P denotes the vector of bus active power 
injections, B is the admittance matrix, and  is 
the vector for bus voltage angles. 
L
 is the vector 
for branch flows, b  is the susceptance matrix, and 
A  is bus-branch incidence matrix (Grainger, J. J. 
and Stevenson Jr, W. D.,1994). 
Eventually, when the network topology and 
electric properties (i.e. generated power and/or 
power demand at each node, reactance of each 
line) of the network component is given, power 




Figure 1: Flowchart of the Overload Cascade Model 
2.3. Overload cascade model (OCM) 
To simulate the cascading failure, the Overload 
Cascade Model (OCM) is adopted (Koc et al., 
2013; Pahwa et al., 2014; See flow chart in Figure 
1). The DC load flow analysis is first performed 
using the initial power grid topology. Afterwards, 
each flow of the lines in the power system is 
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compared with its line capacity. The lines with 
loads beyond their capacity due to the load 
redistribution are removed from the network 
topology. For each iteration of cascading failure 
analysis, the topology of the power grid is re-
constructed. With the updated network topology, 
the load flows are computed again until none of 
the line component trip due to the overload flow. 
The overload cascading process is completed 
when the load flow is finally stabilized. 
2.4. Damage measures 
After cascading failure simulation, the damage of 
the network is quantified in terms of selected 
damage measures based on the condition of the 
final cascading stage. In this paper, the post-
disaster scenario which has more nodes 
disconnected from the power source is considered 
to be more critical. Therefore, the number of 
disconnected nodes from the generator nodes at 
the final stage of cascading failure is selected as a 
damage measure. 
A subjunctive node, which connected to the 
generator node with imaginary non-breakable 
links, is introduced to assess the number of nodes 
isolated from a group of generator nodes (Lee et 
al., 2011). To identify such nodes, the 
connectivity analysis is performed using breadth-
first search (BFS) algorithm (Moore, E. F., 1959). 
3. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL POST-
DISASTER SCENARIOS USING MG-
NSGA 
In this study, we use the multi-group non-
dominant sorting algorithm (MG-NSGA) to 
search the sample space and identify the most 
critical cascading scenarios. To apply MG-NSGA 
to the network cascading failure scenario problem, 
genetic representation of network failure scenario 
and proper objective functions need to be defined. 
3.1. GA-based representation of network 
component failure scenarios 
As shown in Figure 2, each scenario of component 
states can be expressed by a binary string. The 
values 1 and 0 indicate the survival and failure of 
the network component respectively. For the 
example power supply system consisting of 5 
nodes and 4 links in Figure 2(b), the post-disaster 
scenarios can be represented by the binary string 
with length 4. It is important to note that the 
network scenario sampled in the optimization 
process are to simulate the initial failure of the 
network, not the final cascading failure condition 
of the network.  
 
 
Figure 2: (a) General structure of genetic 
representation of network scenarios; and (b) example 
of link failure scenarios and corresponding genetic 
representations 
3.2. Objective functions 
To identify critical scenarios of interest, two 
objective functions are defined for MG-NSGA: (1) 
damage measure, i.e. the number of nodes still 
connected to power generator node at the final 
cascading stage, and (2) the number of links failed 
at the initial stage. In this paper, we consider 
scenarios in which a small number of the initially 
failed link induce a large number of disconnected 
nodes as most critical ones. Using the two 
objectives conflicting with each other, MG-
NSGA can effectively identify the most critical 
scenarios. 
In evaluating the first objective function, i.e. 
the number of nodes connected to the generator 
after potential cascading failures, cascading 
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analysis is performed using the Overload 
Cascading Model (OCM) described in section 2.  
 
 
Figure 4: Flowchart of MG-NSGA 
3.3. Multi-Group NSGA (MG-NSGA) 
MG-NSGA framework (Choi and Song, 2017) is 
a heuristic optimization-based approach to find 
optimal non-dominant solutions using genetic 
operators, i.e. crossover and mutation, and 
selection process. 
As illustrated in Figure 4, the main feature of 
MG-NSGA is in the procedure to assign Pareto 
rank procedure. To resolve the issue of losing 
population diversity in large-size problems, raised 
by various research (Ventresca et al., 2018), the 
authors recently proposed to divide the sample 
space into multiple groups. It is shown in Figure 
5 that more diverse samples are given the first 
Pareto rank when compared to the original 
NSGA-II. By dividing the sample space into 
multiple groups at the rank assignment, samples 
with more diversity are expected to survive 
throughout the generations. Eventually, the final 
Pareto surface can be derived from the improved 
sample diversity. 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of (a) fast-non-dominated 
sorting (NSGA-II), and (b) proposed MG-NSGA 
4. CASE STUDY  
In this paper, a modified version of the IEEE 30 
bus test case in Figure 6(a) is studied. Critical 
cascading scenarios of the power system are 
identified by incorporating OCM into MG-
NSGA-based search. The topology and the 
electric properties of the power system are 
obtained from Alsac and Stott (1974). The power 
generated at each generator node is selected 
within the maximum power limit. The test power 
supply network is modeled as the graph of total 30 
nodes (generator and substations), including 6 
generators, and 41 edges (transmission lines) as 
shown in Figure 6(b). 
Additionally, overload cascade analysis is 
performed using an open source Matlab code, 
MATCAS (Koc et al., 2013) after several 
modifications. First, the initial failure is defined 
by the sampled population generated by MG-
NSGA instead of the removal strategies suggested 
in original MATCASC. Through this 
modification, the initial failure is not restricted to 
single component failure scenarios, and thus 
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cascading failure scenarios induced by multi-
component breakdown can be simulated. Second, 
the line capacity is modified to use the given data. 
 
 
Figure 6: the IEEE 30-bus test system: (a) single line 
diagram; and (b) network graph 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Figure 7 shows the critical cascading scenarios of 
the test case, identified by the proposed method. 
Each point in the plot represents a cascading 
scenario which was archived through the 
evolution process of MG-NSGA. Especially, the 
final Pareto surface, the blue line in the figure, 
indicates the most critical cascading scenarios 
induced by the corresponding number of failed 
links at the initial stage. 
5.1. Critical zone selection 
“Critical zone” is a sub-area of the sample space, 
which is considered particularly important in the 
decision-making process (Choi and Song, 2017). 
For example, suppose the stakeholder of the test 
power network wishes to prevent critical 
scenarios leading to at most 15 network nodes still 
connected to the generator, and the probability 
that more than 10 links fail at the initial stage is 
negligible. In this case, the gray area in Figure 7 
can be considered a critical zone. The samples 
located in the intersection between the critical 
zone and the feasible domain identified by the 
Pareto surface require further investigation. For 
example, the management strategy could be 
designed to minimize the intersection between the 
critical zone and the Pareto surface. In 
determining the boundary of a critical zone, both 
engineering and non-engineering aspects, e.g. 
financial condition of network management 
authority should be taken into account. 
 
 
Figure 7: Cascading scenario archive and final 
Pareto solutions for IEEE30 bus network in the 
sample space defined in terms of the number of nodes 
connected to generators after final cascading stage 
and the number of failed links at the initial stage 
5.2. Verification of results 
Since the proposed search algorithm is heuristic, 
the results from the MG-NSGA should be taken 
with caution. To validate the result of the 
numerical example, we compare the final Pareto 
surface with the solutions obtained by thorough 
enumerations. As shown in Figure 8, Pareto 
surface derived from the MG-NSGA and that 
identified by checking all possible scenarios 
13th International Conference on Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Engineering, ICASP13 
Seoul, South Korea, May 26-30, 2019 
 7 
induced by six cases of the number of initial 
component failures match each other. 
 
Figure 8: Comparison between Pareto surfaces 
achieved from MG-NSGA and all possible solutions. 
5.3. Findings from results 
As indicated in Figure 7, the cascading failure 
impact triggered by the initial failure increase 
disproportionately as the number of initially failed 
links increases. The disproportionate impact is 
mainly due to the non-linearity of the power grid 
cascading failure. As an example, one of the 
critical scenarios is presented in Figure 9 
(represented by “ ” markers in Figure 7). The 
sequence of cascading failures is the most critical 
case that can be induced from four component 
disruptions. Initial failure itself does not impact 
on the connectivity directly because of network 
redundancy. However, due to the sequential loss 
of the links caused by the overload line trip, 21 
nodes among the 30 nodes in the power network 
eventually lose the connection to the power source 
at the final stage. 
It is also noteworthy that the set of most 
critical components, which triggers the most 
critical cascading failure induced from single to 
three initial component failures, is not a subset nor 
has intersection with the set of components 
identified from scenarios induced by four 
component failure scenario. Unless cascading 
scenarios induced by more than four component 
failure are examined, the components identified in 
the first stage of Figure 9 attract less attention than 
many other links of the network. However, 
included in the combination of four, these links 
are identified as the most critical failure 
combination. Therefore, the cascading scenario 
triggered by the multiple failures of the link 




Figure 9: Most critical cascading scenarios induced 
by the 4-component failure (“ ” marker in Figure 7) 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we proposed a method to identify 
critical cascading scenarios of power supply 
systems using MG-NSGA. The critical cascading 
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scenarios, which bring serious consequences such 
as large scale blackout but triggered by a relative 
small number of initial component failures were 
effectively identified. In this approach, cascading 
failures are simulated with consideration of the 
redistribution of the power flow caused by the 
overload line trips, using OCM. As a result, 
several critical combinations, which otherwise 
would attract less attention as a single component, 
were indicated as critical component of the system.  
The presented work is expected to support 
decision makers to mitigate the cascading failure 
risk within the power supply networks through a 
comprehensive decision making process. Through 
a broad demonstration of cascading scenario cases, 
the decision maker would be able to identify 
feasible cascading risk inherent in the power grid. 
With additional development of protection 
and recovery model, the post-disaster condition of 
the power supply network can be further explored. 
Future work will focus on constructing an 
effective decision-making framework to prevent 
the identified worst-case scenarios. It will be also 
meaningful to upgrade the current infrastructure 
network management process by systematic 
treatment of critical post-disaster scenarios. 
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